The paper “Strategic Partisan Transfers in a Fiscal Federation: Evidence from a new Brazilian database” coauthored with Fernanda Marciniuk has been accepted for publication in the Journal of Applied Economics.
Abstract.
This article makes use of a unique database that allows, for the first time, calculating in a precise way the amounts of discretionary transfers from the Brazilian Federal government to municipalities in the period from 1997 to 2012. The new database is used to test the “strategic partisan transfers hypothesis”, which states that mayors from the same party as the president receive higher federal transfers than those from different parties, if the corresponding municipality is situated in a state where the governor is not aligned with the president. In general, the econometric analysis strongly supports the strategic partisan transfers hypothesis. Furthermore, it supports the hypothesis that there is a biannual political transfers cycle in Brazil due to the country’s staggered electoral system with elections every other year.
Please read the entire paper here.
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