

Do you have an appointment? How executives shape electoral careers*

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Work in progress!

Abstract

How do political appointments affect electoral careers? Although there exists a broad literature on political ambition and career trajectories across the globe, little attention has been paid to the role of appointments to cabinet positions and their subnational counterparts. We study this phenomenon in the context of Brazil, a three-tiered federation with multiple appointed positions and possible career paths for politicians. First, we field an elite survey and an expert survey asking Brazilian members of congress and academics respectively to rate the relative status of different appointed and elected positions and employ a novel method to create a ranking from pairwise comparisons. We then assemble an original panel of politicians' career trajectories, including appointed positions. Finally, we test hypotheses on how appointments affect political ambition and electoral success, using matching methods to create comparable groups of appointed and non-appointed politicians. Preliminary results suggest that appointments both boost and launch careers; the appointed have higher chances of running for and winning higher-ranked office than similar politicians who were not appointed to an executive position. We also find that appointments decrease the likelihood that politicians run for lower-ranked positions, which would serve as a “second best” to stay relevant between electoral cycles.

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In July 2005, Fernando Haddad was appointed as minister of education by president Lula, a position that he retained through 2012, the second year of the presidency of Dilma Rousseff, Lula's successor. Haddad, who had never held elected office, left his cabinet post to run successfully for mayor of São Paulo, the largest city in the country and later obtained 45% of the national vote in his (unsuccessful) presidential bid. Rousseff herself had also never held elective office when she ran for president, but had occupied state level cabinet positions before being appointed to different Federal cabinet positions under Lula. Rising politically by appointment is not restricted to politicians of the Workers' Party or to neophytes. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, then a senator, held two cabinet positions in Itamar Franco's government before going on to win the election to succeed him. Examples are even more abundant at lower levels of government: Eduardo Paes started his political career with an appointed position in the city of Rio de Janeiro, before going on to win elections for city councillor and federal deputy. Then, after a stint in the cabinet of state governor Sergio Cabral, Paes won his first election for mayor of Rio. Likewise, Celso Pitta was in Paulo Maluf's municipal cabinet before being elected mayor of São Paulo and Paulo Câmara held multiple state secretariats under Eduardo Campos in the Pernambuco state government before succeeding him.

As a three-tiered federation that roughly replicates its presidential system at all levels, Brazil offers aspiring politicians a host of elected positions in the executive and legislative branches as well as high-profile appointed positions in the executive branches of the local, state, and federal governments. This complexity allows for extremely diverse career paths. The complexity of this ecosystem of political positions remains largely unexplored, however. The literature that exists has centered mostly on determining the extent to which members of Congress seek to move into the executive or to build legislative careers; this is a classic case of "puzzle transfer" in comparative politics that involves a direct or implicit comparison with the ideal-typical career in the United States. No attention has been paid to the importance of occupying many of Brazil's high-profile politically appointed positions in political careers.

This lacuna is puzzling given many high-profile cases, not only those mentioned above but also many other instances of legendary politicians who have built their personal networks of influence by launching and boosting the careers of others through appointments. It is also puzzling given the vast attention paid by the literature to the formation of cabinets. Executive leaders appoint partners to their cabinets to share power and manage coalitions, delegating policy authority and important office perks in the process (Chaisty, Cheeseman & Power 2018, Batista 2017, Amorim Neto 2006). Among these perks are the media visibility, reputation gains of holding such a position, as well the possibility of building their own patronage networks, all of which, presumably, result in future political and electoral advantages for the individual office-holder.

We address this puzzle by systematically assessing the impact of appointments on political

careers. In order to do so, we first implement a novel method to estimate the relative worth of the most important elected and appointed offices in the country, and distinguish between ascending, descending, and lateral career moves. We then assembled and updated data on cabinet level appointments at the federal and state levels, as well as for a few major municipalities, and combine these with data on elections for legislative and executive positions in all levels of government. This allows us to examine whether appointments increase the odds of ascending electoral moves both for new and experienced politicians.

The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we review the literature on career paths in Brazil. In the subsequent sections we describe the institutional context in more detail (Section 2 and present our hypotheses regarding the role of appointments in upward political ambition and mobility (Section 3). Sections 4 and 5, present the analysis and results for the effects of appointments existing and new careers, respectively. The final section evaluates our results and concludes.

1 Executive appointments and electoral career paths

Black's (1972) early study of political ambition in the US states, at its outset, that the alternatives facing elected politicians at the end of their terms "customarily include the choice of dropping out of political life, or seeking reelection, or of choosing to seek higher office." Seeking a lower office or an appointed position in the executive was not an option. In general, analysis of electoral ambition in the US typically focused on legislative careers (MacKenzie & Kousser 2014) and on how the perks of seniority lengthens politicians' careers in Congress (Groseclose & Stewart III 1998). The study of progressive ambition, pioneered in the United States by Rohde (1979), has been less developed.

Work on other contexts typically recognizes that electoral ambition can be fairly different than what is found in the US. Multiple levels of power such as those in federal systems, for instance, create the opportunities for the co-existence of local- and national-level careers (Stolz 2003). The existence of the European Parliament, similarly, opened an alternative career route for ambitious politicians in member countries (Meserve, Pemstein & Bernhard 2009). Work on careers in Latin America has followed a similar line in highlighting the myriad alternative careers paths and their implications for political and electoral strategies (Micozzi 2014).

In Brazil, Santos & Pegurier (2011) explicitly highlighted the differences relative to the US case, stressing both the intense movement not only among the three levels of the Federation (i.e. municipal, state, and national), but also between the legislative and the executive branches of government. Some of these paths are the result of some important institutional differences between the two countries. "The executive's comparative advantage over the legislative in public policy-making" makes executive positions more attractive and further limits legislators'

incentives to specialize (Santos 1999). The “zig-zag career patterns” – first observed by Fleischer (1977), were, in this sense, a natural response to an institutional setting that combines no term limits to legislative positions with the possibility of holding executive office and keeping a legislative position (p. 227). To these characteristics, we add an asynchronous electoral calendar, which further expands the options available to most office holders.

That said, Santos & Pegurier (2011) identify a mandate in the federal Chamber of Deputies as the “linchpin of a successful political career.” Most of the other work on ambition and political careers in Brazil has, likewise, also tended to focus on federal deputies. Samuels (2003) observed career choices made mostly by federal deputies, as they shifted between seeking mayorships, appointed positions, or another term in Congress. A substantive conclusion from this literature, and in stark contrast with the US, as legislators often seek to move out of Congress they did not invest in professionalizing or strengthening the legislative power. Pereira & Rennó (2013) observed similar data, but sought to emphasize the conditions in which congressmen decided to focus on a legislative career.¹ More recently, Meireles (2019) compared the future electoral choices and electoral success of bare winners and losers to the Chamber of Deputies, finding that a win has enduring effects over an individual’s career.

While we do not doubt the importance of becoming a federal deputy, it is in no way a typical “entry level position” and only a very small share of candidates to elective office ever reach that level. Doing so misses much of the action in political recruitment and obscures much of the interplay between executive and legislative positions. Not only elected politicians move across branches and levels of government following many different paths, but politicians frequently take temporary leaves from legislative positions to accept appointments to positions in the executive branch, even at lower levels in the federation. Others start out their electoral careers after stints in appointments positions. Apart from data availability, there is no compelling theoretical reason to place federal deputies at the center of analysis.

In contrast to a relatively sparse literature on careers and political ambition, the literature on determinants and implications of cabinet formation in Brazil (Batista 2017) and beyond is vast (Chaisty, Cheeseman & Power 2018), and suggests that cabinet positions are central to political exchanges in many polities. Most of these studies seek to determine the strategic choices made by the chief of the executive. For at least three decades, the literature has examined the different ways in which executives use appointments to build legislative support, reward loyalists, and survive in office (Geddes 1994). Appointments to cabinet positions are a key part of presidents’ choice of legislative strategy and coalition dynamics (Amorim Neto 2006). We know that cabinet positions matter because they represent control over policy and spending (and budget transfers), appointments to lower-level positions, and contracts, and because they grant visibility to the appointees. But much less attention has been given to the individuals on the other side of

¹A different line of work recognizes that even legislators who wish to remain in Congress do not necessarily wish to invest in strengthening the legislative branch (Cunow et al. 2012).

cabinet appointments despite the fact that all of these features are also likely to help further electoral careers.

Granted, relatively few individuals are ever appointed to ministerial positions in the federal government’s cabinet. However, as we describe in the next section, there exists a very larger number of state- and municipal-level cabinet positions and moving to and from elected positions to appointed ones is a common feature of electoral careers in Brazil.

2 Institutional setting

Brazil holds elections every two years.² *General elections* for president, governors of its 27 federal units, senators, federal deputies to the lower house and state legislators in the states unicameral legislatures are held every four years. On the off-cycle even years, the country holds *local elections* for mayors and councilors in its more than 5,500 municipalities. In any electoral years, all elections are held on the same date, in October.³ Presidents, governors, and mayors of cities with more than 200 thousand registered voters are elected by a majoritarian system with a runoff between the two highest vote getters if the winner fails to secure an outright majority. Mayors of smaller municipalities are elected by a simple first-past-the-post plurality system and so are senators, with the caveat that the latter have 8-year terms and in every other election two seats are up for renewal in each state (all other positions have four year terms). All other legislative positions are elected through open list proportional representation in which states (in the case of federal deputies and state legislators) and municipalities (in the case of councilors) serve as medium- to high-magnitude districts. For this reason, electoral careers tend to be based in states. In some of them, however, it can still be viable to concentrate electoral efforts in specific cities. This is especially the case for São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, the two biggest cities in the country, due to their large populations and the high number of seats available. We present a complete analysis of the states in which city strategies are relevant and, therefore, appointments to the city cabinet are likely to matter is provided in Appendix D.

Since 1997, holders of executive posts are allowed one consecutive reelection and may run again after sitting out at least one term.⁴ In order to run for a different position, however, executive incumbents must resign prior to a deadline that is currently set at six-months prior to the election. The same applies to non-elected individuals who occupy appointed positions in the executive branches at any level.

Executives at the three levels (presidents, governors, and mayors) can freely appoint their

²The current calendar took shape from 1994 onwards, when a change in the presidential term-length made the general elections concurrent.

³Elections are held on the first Sunday in October. Runoffs were held on the third Sunday and now on the fourth Sunday in the same month. The only exception to this in the last three decades was for the 2020 local elections, which took place in November due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

⁴Immediate reelection was introduced by constitutional amendment 16 in 1997.

cabinet members (and a varying number of other high-level positions in the bureaucracy) without need for confirmation by their respective legislatures.

There are no term limits for legislative positions, and incumbents do not need to resign to run for reelection or for any other office. Given the non-concurrent calendars of general and local elections, this means that state- and national-level legislators can run for mayor in the off-cycles without giving up their seats.⁵ Senators serve for eight years (all other terms are of four years) so they could, conceivably, run for executive offices in three mid-term opportunities and still hold the senatorial office if not successful.⁶ State- and national-level legislators can also take a leave of absence and keep their seat if appointed to certain high-level positions in the executives.⁷ The rules for national level legislators (senators and federal deputies) are given by Article 56 of the Federal Constitution that states that legislators can keep their jobs if appointed to a cabinet position at the federal, state, or municipal level (if the city is a state capital) or to a diplomatic mission. A provision in the same article, moreover, also states that the legislators can choose to keep their legislative salaries (presumably if they are higher than that of the position to which they were appointed).

Every state makes similar provisions for state legislators, but the exact wording and offices one can accumulate without losing the legislative seat varies somewhat (see Appendix F). A few of the country's 4.5k municipalities banned councilors from keeping their seats if taking on positions in the executive,⁸ but these are fairly recent prohibitions. In most instances, this form of double dipping is allowed. The fact that politicians have invested effort into guaranteeing that these "double dipping" rules exist is in of itself evidence that politicians value appointments.⁹

Hence, with 27 states and thousands of municipalities, state and municipal cabinet positions can matter considerably for lower-level politicians, and, presumably, these positions are used in the same type of political exchanges as those in the federal level.

⁵It also means that city councilors can do the same in general elections.

⁶Except in the Federal District, the only federal unit without municipal elections.

⁷The seat does not remain vacant. Legislators appointed to the executive branch are temporarily replaced by their *suplentes*, but they can return to their chamber at any time prior to the end of their term.

⁸See, for instance, camarabrusque.sc.gov.br/web/noticia.php?id=4610:Câmara-decide-que-vereador-não-poderá-se-licenciar-do-mandato-para-assumir-cargo-no-executivo and www.nsctotal.com.br/noticias/proibicao-para-vereador-ser-secretario-ganha-forca-pelo-estado.

⁹This is a term we use with some misgiving. What we call "double dipping" here is different from several well-known "dual mandate" rules in democracies, such as the famous *cumul des mandats* in France. In dual mandates, politicians can actually *exercise* both mandates at the same time. This is not the case in Brazil. The Brazilian rule is more accurately expressed as a "right to retreat" rule in which a politician can vacate a legislative seat (where they are replaced by an alternate) to take an executive appointment, but at any moment can exercise the right to return to the seat and displace the alternate. This is a political insurance policy but not technically a dual mandate.

3 Hypotheses

Regardless of whether a cabinet position is given to a staunch supporter or to a skeptical ally, from the perspective of the appointee, at least, occupying cabinet positions can launch new careers and boost existing ones. We theorize that appointments generate these effects both by increasing progressive ambition and increasing chances of electoral success.

Qualitative evidence suggests that politicians value appointments. Not only they have made an effort to include the possibility of cumulating appointed positions with elected legislative ones, but appointments are the object of intense bargaining between executives and parties. Given these beliefs, we expect that appointed politicians will feel emboldened by the resources, exposure, and experience gained in the executive and will subsequently express greater electoral ambition. This implies that:

Hypothesis 1. *Appointment to cabinet positions increases progressive electoral ambition.*

We expect H1 to hold both for politicians who already contested elections at the time of their executive appointment (experienced) and for those who never ran (new entrants). Hence, for experienced politicians, H1 implies that they will be more likely to seek a higher elected position and less likely to seek a lower position than the one they previously contested. Given the possibilities offered by Brazil's staggered electoral calendar, the first is not necessarily implied by the second. For new entrants, greater ambition means that they will be more likely to run for any office and also more likely to seek a higher-than-entry-level position than other similar individuals who have not been appointed to executive positions.

If politicians are indeed correct in valuing appointments, we also expect that appointed individuals will have greater success in their progressive ambition than their non-appointed counterparts.

Hypothesis 2. *Appointment to cabinet positions increases the probability of being elected.*

Here we will examine the unconditional probability of winning a higher office than the one previously held, in the case of experienced politicians, and winning any office for those who had never ran. Note that we have no expectation about experienced candidates winning lower levels office as appointments might increase the chance of success at the same time while they decrease seeking an office that is lower than the one they already hold.

These first hypotheses are about average effects of appointments. We do not expect all appointments to matter equally for all elected officials, however. Hence we have a number of hypotheses about possible heterogeneous effects of appointments on ambition and success. For starters, we hypothesize that

Hypothesis 3. *The effects of appointments on ambition and success are larger for politicians who were elected to offices of lower status than the one they were appointed to.*

We expect, for instance, that appointments to municipal or state secretary would matter more for state legislators than for federal deputies, whereas appointments to ministerial positions, in contrast, can have positive effects for a wider range of office holders and hopefuls. The logic, here, is simply that the higher the office, the more resources (broadly construed) it commands and, therefore, the greater its electoral payoffs should be.

The idea that appointments are more consequential to politicians with originally fewer electoral assets (resources, knowledge, exposure, etc...) also implies that appointments should produce greater effects for members of underrepresented groups. While we do not have data to test this hypothesis on racial groups, we hypothesize that

Hypothesis 4. *The effects of appointments on ambition and success are larger for women.*

For a number of reasons, including, but not restricted to technical difficulties in devising quotas in an open list proportional representation systems, women in Brazil are vastly underrepresented in elected and appointed positions and in party organizations and the ones that do manage to run for office often receive less funding from their parties. Hence, women typically command fewer electoral assets, so appointments would provide a larger relative boost. Add to this the fact that there are fewer women than men in cabinet positions at all levels, it is possible that female appointees stand out more in a less crowded field.

Finally, we also expect that the electoral benefits of occupying an appointed position increase with the length of time an individual occupies the position. This is because the an appointed position is not merely a line in a c.v. What makes the appointed position important is the access to resources it entails. Hence, if we think of appointments as treatments, the time spent in an appointed position should be roughly equivalent to the treatment dosage.

Hypothesis 5. *The effects of appointments on ambition and success are larger the longer the tenure in the appointed position*

4 Do executive appointments boost electoral careers?

Does being appointed to an executive portfolio affect subsequent career paths of elected politicians? The “treatment” in this analysis (appointment) is highly endogenous to the political characteristics of the appointed. In order to improve our capacity to make causal inferences, we leverage the fact that we have a relatively large data set in which important pre-treatment variables are well measured, and we employ matching methods to compare similar politicians who were and were not nominated to executive cabinets. This should allow us to estimate relatively unbiased future electoral effects of political appointments for the appointed.

4.1 Data

We organized a dataset on every candidate that ran in an election in the country from 1998 to 2022 from data provided by the Brazil’s high electoral court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, TSE).¹⁰ The resulting dataset contains 2 million candidate-election observations, with 1.4 million unique candidates (data are summarized in Appendix C), which we then merged with different datasets on appointed positions.

First, we assembled a dataset with all federal ministers from 1989 to 2022 based on Amorim Neto (2006). We then incorporated CEPESP’s Database on State Secretariats,¹¹ which provides personal information on secretaries of all states from the early 1990s to 2014. Finally, we constructed an original dataset of every municipal secretary who served in the cities of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Belo Horizonte, and Fortaleza from 2000 to 2020, by hand-coding public records. This choice reflects the cities in which a local politician has the greatest chance of moving into state and national politics, which is a function of both the size of the city and the state, as discussed in detail in Appendix D. A detailed description of the data sources and original collection is provided in Appendix E.

To allow for the analysis of longer-term outcomes, we added electoral results of two complete election cycles after the baseline, i.e. of the elections held 2, 4, 6, and 8 years after the candidate first ran.¹² This resulted in a dataset with every candidate that ran for any elected office in Brazil since 1998, and whether they held a ministry, state secretariat, or municipal secretariat in the selected state capitals at any point in the same period. We identified 126 ministers, 570 state secretaries, and 208 municipal secretaries who ran for office (successfully or not) in the relevant election immediately preceding their appointment. While we refer to this election generically as t_0 , we include individuals for whom t_0 is any election year from 1998 to 2020.

4.2 Outcomes: Which way is up?

Our goal is to examine electoral career paths *after* appointments. In order to evaluate the extent to which politicians seek and succeed moving upwards in their political career, it is necessary to determine the relative status of the many electoral positions available to them, which is by no means always obvious in Brazil. We tackled this issue by surveying professional politicians (sitting federal legislators) to determine what they see as the relative value of political offices. In order to avoid an overly demanding survey instrument, we presented participants several randomly generated pairwise comparisons of elected positions and asked them to select

¹⁰With the exception of candidates for vice-mayor, vice-governor, senator *suplente*, vice-president, and president.

¹¹Available at <https://cepespdata.io/consulta/secretarios> (FGV CEPESP 2020).

¹²Our main results only report effects for $t + 2$ and $t + 4$, but the effects in the second cycle are substantively very similar to the ones in the first cycle, only smaller in magnitude (which makes sense, imagining that effects should fade over time).

the most valuable one in each pair. This generated 445 pairwise evaluations of 12 different elected positions, by 112 different legislators. We then employed the model proposed by Bradley & Terry (1952) to analyze pairwise comparisons to estimate the scaling of offices implicit in legislator’s survey answers, following recent similar uses of this model (Loewen, Rubenson & Spirling 2012, Zucco, Batista & Power 2019, Blumenau & Lauderdale N.d.) (see Appendix A for details).

Figure A1 reports the estimated worth of each of the 12 positions in the survey graphically (see Appendix A1 for point estimates). A state governorship was estimated to be the highest office, so we defined it, *ex-post*, as the reference category whose worth was arbitrarily set as zero. Senator and minister (i.e. member of the president’s cabinet) were next, followed closely by mayor of large municipalities and federal deputy. The difference between the last and the first of these four offices was very close to statistical significance, but all offices in this group have very similar values.

Mayor of smaller municipalities came next. The larger confidence interval on this item is more a product of the item having been rated fewer times than of respondent’s uncertainty about its value. This uncertainty notwithstanding, politicians considered this item to be more valuable than state legislators and state-level cabinet positions, which in turn beat large municipality cabinet positions and large municipality councilors. Smaller municipalities councilors and cabinet positions closed the list. In most instances, elected positions trumped appointed ones and executive positions trumped legislative ones.

These estimates suggest that senators and federal deputies are similar to ministerial positions while state legislators are of comparable worth with state secretariats. However, it is important to remember that senators, federal deputies, state legislators and most councilors can occupy executive positions without giving up (the right to) their legislative seats. Hence, it would not be entirely surprising for, say, a federal deputy to occupy a state or even a large municipality’s cabinet position. In fact, this is not an extremely rare occurrence, at least in the larger municipalities of the country. Federal deputies Pedro Paulo and Marcelo Calero, for example, served in the city of Rio’s cabinet under mayor Eduardo Paes and Jilmar Tatto served in Fernando Haddad’s cabinet in the city of São Paulo.

Cabinet positions are also often consolation prizes for politicians who occupied or attempted higher offices. Eduardo Paes (RJ) and Humberto Costa (PE) both became state secretaries for governors who defeated them in gubernatorial elections (Sergio Cabral and Eduardo Campos, respectively) – they both lost in the first round and supported the winner in the runoff.

Reducing the myriad of career moves into moving up, down, or laterally, helps us begin to make sense of the very complex data. Descriptive analysis suggests that ambitious politicians do attempt to “move up.” Almost a quarter of candidates who win a seat as councilors in large cities run for national office in subsequent races, though very few councilors in small cities do so.




Figure 1: Estimated worth of elected and appointed political offices

Notes: * and ** indicate $p < 0.1$ and $p < 0.05$ respectively for tests of differences of estimates between politicians and elites. Bars show confidence intervals computed from quasi standard errors. Value of the governorship was arbitrarily fixed at zero. S = small/medium-sized municipalities (less than 200 thousand voters); L = large municipalities (200 thousand voters or more)

Office-holders from large cities have larger constituencies by definition, and thus a higher chance of success for higher office, a point to which we return momentarily. In this sense, even the percentage of mayors of large cities that decide to run in federal elections is not negligible at over 5%, representing 25 out of 451 cases. This is partly explained by the fact that mayors of state capitals or large cities are typically seen as “natural candidates” for gubernatorial elections. Indeed, 19 of the 25 cases ran for governor, including famous cases such as José Serra and João Dória who resigned from their positions as mayors of São Paulo, in 2006 and 2018 respectively, to run for governor of the richest state in the federation. Giving up an executive position, however, is a fairly risky proposition. Bruno Siqueira was elected mayor of Juiz de Fora (MG, >200k voters) in 2016, resigned in 2018 to run for senator, but realized he had no chance and settled on running for state deputy and ended up losing. Eduardo Leite resigned just before the end of his first term as governor of Rio Grande do Sul, to be able to run for president. When his candidacy faltered, he ended up running for governor again, but no longer as the incumbent.

Among those who run for state and federal legislative positions, losers are more likely than winners to run again for lower-ranked offices. Winners, on the other hand, are much more likely to aim upward. Likewise, those who aim for high-ranking office and lose are more likely to run again for any position than those who aim for lower office (26%). Hence, overall, our rankings of the importance of the positions do seem to pass muster.

With a measure of the importance of each position in hands, we were able to define a series of outcomes of interest related to the future career path and that allow us to test our hypotheses about ambition and success. Our main outcomes are winning an election for higher-ranked office (unconditional on running),¹³ and running for positions ranked higher/lower according to our BT estimates from politicians, for elections on t_{+2} and t_{+4} .

4.3 Analysis

We evaluate our hypotheses by comparing these outcomes for individuals who were appointed to positions in the executive to those of similar individuals who were not appointed. We defined similar appointed and non-appointed candidates through nearest-neighbor propensity score matching with replacement, matching on age, gender, level of education, share of the vote, and having won the election at t_0 , within (i.e., with exact matching for) candidates who ran for the same office in the same state and year and who were in the same pre-election coalition as the executive candidate (mayors, governors, and presidents for municipal secretaries, state secretaries, and ministers respectively) who would eventually win the race.

For example, a candidate who ran for federal deputy in the state of Pernambuco in 2010

¹³This generates a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the candidate ran and won that election and 0 otherwise – whether they ran and lost or did not run. See Song (2018) and De Magalhães (2015) for discussions on why this is generally preferable to estimating effects on the subset of candidates who ran again in the following election.

in Eduardo Campos’s electoral coalition and eventually became a state secretary was matched to another candidate for federal deputy from her coalition in that election who had similar probability of being appointed given their age, educational attainment, gender, share of the vote, and elected status, but who was not appointed a secretary. This matches appointed politicians to non-appointed individuals who are at a similar point in their careers, have similar reputations, and were (at least during the elections) both either in favor or against the would-be president, governor, or mayor.

4.4 Main results

We begin with assessments of H1 and H2, which are expectations about the “main effects” of appointments on our three outcomes: winning a higher position, running for a higher position, and running for a lower position. Figure 2 presents our estimates; we report the control group mean (non-appointed), the treatment group mean (appointed), and the latter’s 95% confidence interval.


The first, and perhaps most conspicuous pattern in the data is a sharp reduction in the probability of running for office in subsequent local elections in t_{+2} . Politicians in our sample who are nominated as ministers *never* run for lower-ranked office in subsequent local elections, a 10 percentage points reduction ($p < 0.01$). The effect is half as big for state secretaries (-0.06 , $p < 0.01$). Municipal secretaries do not face the same decrease.

The likely interpretation here is that running in local elections and holding an appointed position are substitutes for staying relevant between general elections. Once appointed to a state secretariat or ministry, politicians do not need to run in relatively lower-status local elections. For those who have a chance to run for a higher office during this period, however, there is no such reduction, as attested by the lack of change in the probability of running and winning higher office in t_{+2} .

This pattern does not hold in the subsequent general elections (t_{+4}). While there is no change in probability of running for lower-ranked positions, there is a marked increase in running for higher-ranked office (0.10 , $p < .05$). The probability of winning for those higher-level positions remains unchanged. State secretaries have weaker but still significant increases in both of these outcomes (0.03 of running and 0.02 of winning, both $p < .05$). These effects are still substantively large relative increases, representing 75–100% over baseline rates of 4% and 2% in the control group.

Effects for municipal secretaries are insignificant across the board, but the point estimates are in the expected directions. Taken together, as summarized by the pooled results, these results suggest that appointments to cabinet positions decrease the probability of running for lower-ranked offices in local elections while they increase the probability of running and especially that of winning higher-ranked offices in the general elections. This suggests that political

Effects of appointments in subsequent midterm election (t+2)



Effects of appointments in subsequent electoral cycle (t+4)




Figure 2: Effects of executive appointments on subsequent career paths




Figure 3: Effects of political appointments on candidates by relative status of appointed position to office sought at t_0

appointments help politicians “move up”.

4.5 Results for heterogeneous effects

These are average effects for a sample that includes candidates originally running for several different offices at t_0 . It is likely the case that appointments to cabinet positions are not equally interesting or useful for politicians who were at different stages in their careers in t_0 . We use the pooled dataset (including politicians appointed to all three executive positions and their matched control units) throughout this subsection to evaluate H3-H5, which refer to heterogeneous effects of appointments on careers.

By Office: For Figure 3, we use our BT rankings to estimate the importance of the appointed position relative to the office the politician sought at t_0 . For instance, everyone who ran for city councilor in small cities will be classified as being appointed to a higher position, while a ministry is a higher position for a federal deputy but not for a senator. Confirming expectations, effects are stronger for candidates appointed to higher-ranked positions (than the ones they were originally ran for); they are more likely to run (0.09, $p < 0.001$ for t_2 and 0.06, $p < 0.001$ for t_4) and win (0.04, $p < 0.001$ and 0.03, $p < 0.05$) for higher office. Interestingly, these cases are driving the positive effects in t_2 , that are stronger than at t_4 . The opposite is true for candidates appointed to positions lower than the office they sought; they have null effects across the board in t_2 , but positive and significant effects later on.




Figure 4: Effects of political appointments on candidates by gender

By gender: When we split our dataset by gender, we run into power limitations. Women are a very small minority of elected politicians in Brazil, but an even smaller share of the appointed office-holders (only 7% of our matched sample). Still, we believe the exercise is relevant because appointments can be particularly important for boosting the careers of women, who are underrepresented in party structures and have less access to campaign finance and other resources within their parties; Dilma Rousseff, the first (and so far only) woman to hold the presidency of Brazil, launched her political career through occupying cabinet positions.

Results in figure 4 show that appointments do indeed seem to further female candidates' ambitions and careers, particularly in the immediate subsequent midterm election. While men are no more likely to run or win for higher office in $t + 2$, there are significant positive effects for women (0.11, $p < 0.01$ and 0.08, $p < 0.01$ for running and winning respectively). In the election at $t + 4$, appointed women are no more likely to run for higher office than their non-appointed counterparts but are more likely to win.

It is not yet clear what the mechanism in play is here. One possibility is that female politicians are less connected to existing party structures and less likely to have established careers, so visibility effects are stronger for them. Or maybe executive officeholders are selecting female cabinet members on another unobservable variable that makes them more likely to succeed in the future.

Time in appointed position: While many ministers and secretaries only spend a couple of months in office due to cabinet reshuffles, others remain there for most or all of the executive officeholder's term. The median days spent in an appointed position during a term is about




Figure 5: Effects of political appointments on candidates by time in appointed position

400, so we split the sample into matched pairs where the treated candidate was in office for longer than 1 year or less than that. Here we only consider outcomes in $t + 4$, and per H5 we expect effects to be stronger for those who spent more time in office.

Results in figure 5 confirm that expectation: the effects are driven by, and stronger for, longer appointments. There are no significant differences in running or winning for higher office for candidates who were appointed for less than a year, but longer appointments double and triple these likelihoods for the appointed (0.046 and 0.032 for running and winning respectively, both $p < 0.01$).

5 Do Executive Appointments Launch Careers?

In some of the most high profile cases mentioned in the introduction – including that of Dilma Rousseff and Fernando Haddad – appointees only contested their first election *after* occupying high profile appointed executive positions. In these cases, more than just “boosting” electoral careers, appointments might have launched them. In this section we investigate whether our hypotheses hold for politicians who had not yet ran for office at the time of their appointment to positions in the executive branch.

5.1 Data

The task of assessing whether appointments can launch the electoral careers of individuals who were previously not previously is harder than assessing whether they can boost careers because we need to match on covariates observed prior the running for office for the first time. This

implies collecting data on individuals prior to their entry into our dataset of electoral candidates dataset. As being affiliated with a party is a requirement to run in any election in Brazil, we are able to obtain data on pre-electoral characteristics and on individuals who did not run for office from the data set of party membership maintained by the TSE. We thus created a modified version of the dataset described above that includes the official party membership data as the starting point. We restructured these data into a panel of party members at a year t_0 who had never run for elective office in any $t < 0$ and merged it with the above mentioned electoral careers and appointment data.

5.2 Outcomes

We also modify our outcomes of interest; since the individuals in the modified dataset did not have prior electoral careers, it does not make sense to speak of running for lower- or higher-ranked offices. We thus measure effects of appointments on running for any office, running for non-entry-level positions, and winning for any office. Entry-level positions are *vereadores* (city councillors) in local elections and state deputies in general elections, so running for non-entry-level positions is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the individual ran for any position other than these.¹⁴

5.3 Analysis

TSE's party members data are not as rich as the candidate data; we do not have as many pre-treatment covariates to match one as we had in the previous analysis. Thus match only on gender, time since joining the current party, and time since first joining any party, with exact matching by year, state, and coalition.

5.4 Main Results

Figure 6 shows the estimated effect of having been appointed in the previous electoral cycle (from t_{-4} to t_0) on the outcomes at t_0 . Effects are generally significant for both positions and substantively quite large – appointments more than double the chance of running for elective office (0.24, $p < 0.001$), although this effect is driven by state secretaries and non-significant for ministers. Most individuals in the control group who run do so for entry-level positions; appointments greatly increase the probability of running for higher office (0.17 for secretaries and 0.45 for ministers, both $p < 0.01$), and it is not surprising that effects are larger for the more visible ministerial appointments. Finally, the comparable untreated individuals rarely ever win their first contested elections, while cabinet members often do (0.15 for secretaries and 0.3 for ministers, both $p < 0.01$).

¹⁴We are in the process of cleaning the data for municipal secretaries, so in this version we only report results for ministers and state secretaries.




Figure 6: Effects of political appointments on launching careers

These results are still preliminary, but suggest that appointments are a highly effective tool for launching careers: comparable political newbies are much more likely to run, “skip” entry-level positions, and succeed in their very first election if they held an appointed position in the executive.

6 Conclusion

In this paper we examine the effects of appointments to municipal, state, and federal level cabinet position on subsequent electoral ambition and success. Several findings stand out. Appointments have a very large effect on launching careers. That is, individuals who are appointed prior to having ran for any office have a much higher probability of running for office, seeking higher than entry-level electoral positions, and winning office than “similar” party members who were not appointed. Most appointments also increase upward ambition, decrease downward mobility, and increase the probability of winning for individuals who already held elected office (and compared to similar already elected individuals).

In addition to these substantive results, the paper also makes several other contributions to the literature. It presents estimates of the relative worth of elected and appointed political positions in Brazil, across all levels of governments. These estimates can be of interest for scholars working on several other aspects of the Brazilian political system. We also present original data on municipal level appointments, a combined dataset of elections and appointments, and

a framework of analysis that simplifies the analysis of extremely complex career patterns.

That appointments can boost an electoral career should not be surprising to politicians, given the effort spent preserving and sometimes expanding this prerogative. Given that executives are the ones responsible for appointments and that appointments help boost careers, it is perhaps the case that part of the lure of holding executive office is the ability to appoint individuals and thus to create a cadre of followers occupying electoral positions. They also suggest that executives have the opportunities to create personalized cadres that might perform many of the functions commonly attributed to political parties. In fact, several politicians have stood out over the years as career launching and boosting experts and have gone on to enjoy near mythical status.

This power might not be unlimited, however. In several cases creatures have turned against their creators and either directly challenged their original appointers or simply broken ranks with them in the face of better prospects. While such cases may be examples of limits to the power of those who make appointments, they nonetheless underscore the importance of appointments in promoting electoral careers.

Self-made politicians do exist. But when it comes to electoral careers, while the Brazilian political system accepts “walk-ins”, appointments are greatly preferred.

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Do You Have an Appointment? How Executives Shape Electoral Careers in Brazil

--Supplemental Information--

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Appendix A Estimating the importance of elected positions

In order to evaluate the extent to which politicians seek and succeed moving upwards in their political career, it is necessary to determine the relative status of the many positions available to them. We tackle the complications of establishing which political positions are more valuable than others by surveying legislators to determine what they see as the relative value of political offices. Our use of a survey means that we rely on stated as opposed to revealed preferences, but we do so in a way that is not overly demanding or constraining by employing the Bradley-Terry (BT) model to pairwise comparisons to obtain estimate the scaling of offices implicit on legislator’s survey answers.

A1 Data

We fielded our survey of politicians in 2021 with congresspeople serving in the 56th legislature.¹ The survey contained several other questions unrelated to this paper, but for our present purposes, each participant was also presented with four pairs of elected and appointed political positions and asked to identify the most desirable one within each pair.² After discarding item missing responses, our dataset contained 445 pairwise evaluations of the 12 positions, by 112 out of the 118 legislators who participated in the survey.

We also fielded similar pairwise comparisons of the same items with members of the Brazilian Political Science Association in early 2022, with the sole differences being that each respondent had the opportunity to rate more pairs of offices and that we were able to recruit substantially more respondents. The result was a considerable larger data set with 4,762 pairwise comparisons made by 434 subjects.

A2 Analysis

The BT model was originally proposed in Bradley & Terry (1952), and has been extended in several ways over the years in many different fields, most notably Psychology to recover implicit “ability” scales from the outcomes of observed pairwise comparisons. The items may be evaluated based on subjective evaluations of properties of the objects made by referees or on “objective” outcomes such as estimating the strength of football teams from game results, or the quality of scientific journals by citation patterns.

Some closely related models have been employed in the political science literature but direct applications of the BT model are surprisingly quite rare. The model was used in an analysis of value orientation in Europe (Francis, Dittrich, Hatzinger & Penn 2002) and to analyze data from a survey experiment designed to assess which types of arguments are most persuasive in a referendum Loewen, Rubenson & Spirling (2012). More recently, Zucco, Batista & Power (2019) applied the BT model to retrieve a scale of the relative salience of cabinet positions

¹Due to Covid-19 restrictions, while the survey was officially launched in March, the bulk of the data collection happened between September and December.

²Participants could answer the survey online or in pen and paper. For the pen-and-paper version, we generated four different survey versions that presented four different pairwise comparisons to each respondent. In the online version, the pairs were randomly generated for each respondent. In both cases, we employed a stratified the jobs in three tiers of offices. The first three pairwise comparisons were drawn from within each of the tiers, and the fourth was between tiers. This way, we minimized very lopsided comparisons (i.e. governor vs. small town councillor).

in Brazil, in a context in which the large number of items (37 ministries) made other options very impractical, and Blumenau & Lauderdale (N.d.) employed the model in a new study of persuasiveness.

In a typical application of the BT model, the items being evaluated are sometimes referred to as ‘players’, those making the decisions are ‘referees’ or ‘subjects’, and the underlying scale being recovered is referred to as the ‘ability’ of the players or ‘worth’ of the items. In our case, each elected or appointed office is an ‘item’ (X), each ‘referee’ is a legislator or expert that responded to our survey and ‘ability’ is the value or worth of each office (α). In each ‘contest’ or comparison between two offices, our subjects were asked to choose the most valuable one; ties were not allowed. We are not interested in examining the impact of specific attributes of each item on this choice, as is typically the case in conjoint analysis applications. Instead, we simply want to retrieve the underlying relative value for each item.

The BT model is ideally suited for this because it is built on the probability that one item X_i is chosen over another X_j in a pairwise contest, which we represent as $\pi_{i,j}$. This probability can then be expressed as function of the underlying worth of each item, which we label α_i , such that:

$$\pi_{ij} = \frac{\alpha_i}{\alpha_i + \alpha_j} \quad (1)$$

In its original formulation, this probability of selection is then expressed in terms of exponential functions $\exp(\lambda_i) \equiv \alpha_i$ of the underlying worth and by employing a logit link function. This leads, to:

$$\text{logit}(\pi_{ij}) = \lambda_i - \lambda_j \quad (2)$$

In short, λ_i is a transformation of the underlying worth α_i , which determines the probability of one item being chosen over another in pairwise contexts, as defined in Equation 1.³

This logit specification is precisely what characterizes the BT model. Similar models have been proposed that use alternative specifications.⁴ As discussed in previous work on the subject (Luce, Krantz, Suppes & Tversky 1990, Loewen, Rubenson & Spirling 2012), this specification meets the strong stochastic transitivity condition, such that when $\pi_{ij} \geq 1/2$ and $\pi_{j,k} \geq 1/2$, then $\pi_{i,k} \geq \max(\pi_{ij}, \pi_{jk})$. This is important because items that are not directly compared in any contest can be indirectly compared, as long as the design is connected (i.e. that no subset of the items exists that is has not been compared to another subset of the data) (Bradley 1984). Additionally, as long as no item wins all its contests and no subgroup of items exists that its members always win contests against other subgroup of items, the parameters in this model can be estimated by maximum likelihood with either a sum constraint ($\sum_{i=1}^n \lambda_i = 0$) or, more commonly, a reference object constraint ($\lambda_i = 0$ for one $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$). For the remaining parameters, standard errors are computed as usual.⁵ Items that beat items with larger α receive a larger boost to their own α because information from one contest is implicitly used in other contests.

This basic BT setup is often referred to as the “unstructured” model. A number of extensions of the basic BT model have been developed (Springall 1973, Stuart-Fox, Firth, Moussalli &

³See the appendix for how to get from Equation 1 to 2.

⁴If, instead, the difference in the worth of each item were modelled using a normal cumulative distribution, it would define the related Thurstone (1927) model (For a detailed discussion, see Bradley 1984, Cattelan 2012).

⁵Items that show up more often will have smaller confidence intervals.

Whiting 2006), but in our application we simply want to retrieve the underlying worths of each position.

A3 Results

Figure A1 reports the estimated worth of each of the 12 positions in the survey graphically (see Appendix A1 for point estimates). A state governorship was estimated to be the highest office, so we defined it, ex-post, as the reference category whose worth was arbitrarily set as zero. Senator and minister (i.e. member of the president's cabinet) were next, followed closely by mayor of large municipalities and federal deputy. The difference between the last and the first of these four offices was very close to statistical significance, but all offices in this group have very similar values.

Mayor of smaller municipalities came next. The larger confidence interval on this item is more a product of the item having been rated fewer times than of respondent's uncertainty about its values. This uncertainty notwithstanding, politicians considered this item to be more valuable than state legislators and state-level cabinet positions, which in turn beat large municipality cabinet positions and large municipality councilors. Smaller municipalities councilors and cabinet positions closed the list. In general, elected positions trumped appointed ones and executive positions trumped legislative ones.

Estimates for experts are much more precise due to a larger sample size. Experts and politicians agreed almost entirely on the relative importance of elected and appointed offices. The biggest rank discrepancy of the exercise consisted in experts ranking mayor of small or medium cities two positions lower and state level cabinet position two positions higher than politicians, but as Figure A1 shows, differences between estimates are only statistically significant for small town mayorships ($p=0.094$), councilor of large municipalities ($p=0.061$) and small municipalities ($p=0.026$).⁶ In general, experts saw greater distinctions between a group of elite offices, a group of three medium-status offices, and the group of lower-status ones, while these distinctions were less marked in politicians' ratings.

Experts and politicians agreed almost entirely on the relative importance of elected and appointed offices. Experts and politicians inverted the relative position of ministries and senators, but in both cases the two positions were statistically indistinguishable from each other. The two groups also inverted the ordering of municipal secretary and councilor of small towns, with experts putting secretary ahead of councilor and elites doing the opposite. In the biggest rank discrepancy of the exercise, experts ranked mayor of small or medium cities two positions lower and state level cabinet position two positions higher than politicians.




Figure A1: Estimated worth of elected and appointed political offices

Notes: * and ** indicate $p < 0.1$ and $p < 0.05$ respectively for tests of differences of estimates between politicians and elites. Bars show confidence intervals computed from quasi standard errors. Value of the governorship was arbitrarily fixed at zero. S = small/medium-sized municipalities (less than 200 thousand voters); L = large municipalities (200 thousand voters or more)

Table A1: Estimated Worth of Offices — Elite Survey

Office	estimate	sig	rank.05	rank.95
Governador	0.000		1	1
Senador	-0.970	**	2	3
Ministro de Estado	-1.091	**	2	3
Prefeito de município grande	-1.486	**	2	4
federal deputy	-1.638	**	2	5
Prefeito de município médio ou pequeno	-2.392	**	4	7
state legislator	-2.910	**	5	7
Secretário Estadual	-3.039	**	5	8
Secretário de município grande	-3.584	**	7	9
councilor de município grande	-3.880	**	8	9
councilor de município médio ou pequeno	-5.008	**	10	10
Secretário de município médio ou pequeno	-6.249	**	11	11

Table B2: Summary of covariates at t

Office sought	Group	n	% won	% of the vote	Age	% in winning coalition
Deputado Estadual	a	46331	8.77	0.2	46.83	30.25
	c	260	56.92	1.2	48.26	61.54
	t	260	60.38	1.3	47.01	61.54
Deputado Federal	a	17180	11.59	0.6	48.41	28.61
	c	143	48.95	3.2	49.38	70.63
	t	143	41.96	3.5	50.38	70.63
Senador	a	873	17.98	12	53.9	16.15
	c	10	50	18.4	52.4	40
	t	10	30	18.4	55.8	40
Governador	a	673	15.75	15.8	50.3	15.75
	c	6	0	1.7	52.5	0
	t	6	0	8.3	54.33	0

Note: a = All untreated observations; c = matched control observations; t = treated observations.

Appendix B Balance before and after matching

Appendix C Career Paths

Table C3 summarizes the dataset. The first three columns indicate the initial position sought by the candidate, their electoral result at the baseline year, and how many candidates are in that group from 1998 to 2016. The following three columns describe the candidates' decisions in the off-cycle election two years after the baseline: what percentage of candidates ran again and whether they ran for a position ranked higher or lower according to our elites survey. Our

⁶P-values of the differences between estimates across types of respondents were performed by estimating the BT model on a pooled dataset of experts and politicians and adding a categorical variable for type of respondent interacted with all items and examining the p-value of the coefficients on these interactions. This model was estimated with the `prefmod` package in R (Hatzinger & Maier 2017).




Figure A2: Comparison of elites and experts implicit valuation of offices

classification of the worth of each office is based solely on the value of the point estimates according to politicians. This means, for example, that if a candidate ran for federal deputy at time t_0 and for mayor of a large municipality at t_{+2} , we consider them as “aiming up” even though the BT estimates for the two positions are not statistically different from each other. The t_{+4} columns follow the same pattern, also in comparison to the position sought at t , with the addition of a column indicating whether the candidate remained “static”, i.e. ran again for the same office as they did in the baseline. The last two columns show what percentage of the candidates ran and ran for higher-ranked positions in either (or both) of the two elections following the baseline.

Appendix D Vote Potential across State Capitals

This table shows the “vote potential” across state capitals for all states – basically, how many federal deputies could be elected with votes from the capital alone. This is obtained by dividing the share of the state’s population that lives in the capital (pct_cap) by the percentage of votes needed to guarantee a seat in Congress, which is called an electoral quotient in Brazilian law and is given by $1/M$ where M is the number of seats the state has in Congress (the district magnitude). This will be a function of the state’s population (which determines magnitude) and how concentrated it is in the capital. São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, the two biggest cities in the country, clearly stand out – votes from the capital could elect almost 20 members of Congress in both cases. All other capitals, including ones with populations of millions in states with large caucuses in Congress, lag behind.

round vote_pot to a single decimal digit

Table C3: Short-term career paths of politicians, 1998–2022

Position	Result	n	t+2			t+4			Any time		
			Run	Up	Down	Run	Up	Static	Down	Run	Up
Counc. (S)	Loss	1.4kk	0.46	0.46	–	26.14	0.24	25.9	–	26.36	0.67
Counc. (S)	Win	268k	1.41	1.41	–	71.82	3.09	68.73	–	72.21	4.33
Counc. (L)	Loss	184k	6.39	6.39	–	25.3	0.19	24.54	0.57	28.88	6.51
Counc. (L)	Win	10k	24.73	24.73	–	79.75	3.67	76.06	0.02	86.8	26.28
State Deputy	Loss	74k	30.1	4.2	25.9	15.64	3.36	12.28	–	38.48	7.29
State Deputy	Win	6.3k	14.04	14.01	0.03	73.13	9.23	63.89	–	78.27	21.82
Mayor (S)	Loss	47k	5.92	1.7	4.22	36.69	0.01	26.09	10.59	39.41	1.7
Mayor (S)	Win	27k	0.32	0.1	0.22	48.41	0.02	48.14	0.25	48.69	0.11
Fed. Deputy	Loss	28k	31.47	1.16	30.32	19.9	0.46	11.65	7.78	42.2	1.55
Fed. Deputy	Win	3.1k	12.36	9.2	3.15	73.33	6.44	65.04	1.85	77.27	15.09
Mayor (L)	Loss	2.3k	55.05	7.18	47.87	36.99	–	20.84	16.14	68.54	7.18
Mayor (L)	Win	451	5.54	4.66	0.89	47.01	–	46.34	0.67	52.33	4.66
Senator	Loss	1154	32.15	–	32.15	35.7	3.81	6.33	25.56	53.38	3.81
Senator	Win	240	3.33	–	3.33	28.75	28.75	0	0	30.83	28.75
Governor	Loss	881	33.48	–	33.48	46.2	–	11.12	35.07	60.39	–
Governor	Win	160	0	–	0	58.75	–	40	18.75	58.75	–

Note: S = small/medium-sized municipalities (less than 200 thousand voters); L = large municipalities (200 thousand voters or more). Columns 4 to 12 indicate the percentage of candidates in the group who fall into that category. Dashes indicate cells where the movement would not be possible, e.g. candidates who ran for governor cannot possibly move up because they were already running for the highest possible office.

Table D4: Vote potential of capital cities relative to state electoral quotient

State	Capital	Pop. cap	Pop. state	Pct. cap	M	Quoc	Cap. vote pot.
SP	São Paulo	11,253,503	41,262,199	0.273	70	0.014	19.091
RJ	Rio de Janeiro	6,320,446	15,989,929	0.395	46	0.022	18.183
BA	Salvador	2,675,656	14,016,906	0.191	39	0.026	7.445
MG	Belo Horizonte	2,375,151	19,597,330	0.121	53	0.019	6.423
CE	Fortaleza	2,452,185	8,452,381	0.290	22	0.045	6.383
RR	Boa Vista	284,313	450,479	0.631	8	0.125	5.049
PR	Curitiba	1,751,907	10,444,526	0.168	30	0.033	5.032
AP	Macapá	398,204	669,526	0.595	8	0.125	4.758
PE	Recife	1,537,704	8,796,448	0.175	25	0.040	4.370
AM	Manaus	1,802,014	3,483,985	0.517	8	0.125	4.138
RS	Porto Alegre	1,409,351	10,693,929	0.132	31	0.032	4.085
GO	Goiânia	1,302,001	6,003,788	0.217	17	0.059	3.687
AC	Rio Branco	336,038	733,559	0.458	8	0.125	3.665
PA	Belém	1,393,399	7,581,051	0.184	17	0.059	3.125
MA	São Luís	1,014,837	6,574,789	0.154	18	0.056	2.778
AL	Maceió	932,748	3,120,494	0.299	9	0.111	2.690
PI	Teresina	814,230	3,118,360	0.261	10	0.100	2.611
MS	Campo Grande	786,797	2,449,024	0.321	8	0.125	2.570
PB	João Pessoa	723,515	3,766,528	0.192	12	0.083	2.305
SE	Aracaju	571,149	2,068,017	0.276	8	0.125	2.209
RO	Porto Velho	428,527	1,562,409	0.274	8	0.125	2.194
RN	Natal	803,739	3,168,027	0.254	8	0.125	2.030
MT	Cuiabá	551,098	3,035,122	0.182	8	0.125	1.453
TO	Palmas	228,332	1,383,445	0.165	8	0.125	1.320
SC	Florianópolis	421,240	6,248,436	0.067	16	0.062	1.079
ES	Vitória	327,801	3,514,952	0.093	10	0.100	0.933

Appendix E Observational data handling and sources

E1 Appointees

Explain CEPESP data

Explain Octavio's data and our additional collection

Explain our own collection of municipal level data.

E2 Electoral Data

Electoral data is available from TSE...

Explain how we linked the data...

For both the municipal secretaries and the ministers, we cross-referenced different sources to get unique identifiers that would allow us to match individuals to the electoral data, such as their CPF (a unique tax identifier) or *titulo eleitoral* (a unique registered-voter ID). The CEPESP data already included these identifiers

E3 Party Membership Data

Fusce mauris. Vestibulum luctus nibh at lectus. Sed bibendum, nulla a faucibus semper, leo velit ultricies tellus, ac venenatis arcu wisi vel nisl. Vestibulum diam. Aliquam pellentesque, augue quis sagittis posuere, turpis lacus congue quam, in hendrerit risus eros eget felis. Maecenas eget erat in sapien mattis porttitor. Vestibulum porttitor. Nulla facilisi. Sed a turpis eu lacus commodo facilisis. Morbi fringilla, wisi in dignissim interdum, justo lectus sagittis dui, et vehicula libero dui cursus dui. Mauris tempor ligula sed lacus. Duis cursus enim ut augue. Cras ac magna. Cras nulla. Nulla egestas. Curabitur a leo. Quisque egestas wisi eget nunc. Nam feugiat lacus vel est. Curabitur consectetur.

Appendix F Double Dipping Rules

The 1988 Federal Constitution stipulates that:

Art. 56. Não perderá o mandato o Deputado ou Senador: I - investido no cargo de Ministro de Estado, Governador de Território, Secretário de Estado, do Distrito Federal, de Território, de Prefeitura de Capital ou chefe de missão diplomática temporária. . . .

During the drafting of the 1988 Constitution, there were a few amendment proposals to Art. 56 that would allow legislators to keep their seats if they became mayors as well. At least in parts this might come from the AI-3 during the dictatorship, which instituted indirect elections for mayor and the appointed was usually a legislator. But the question came up even when the new elections were already set to be direct. Sometimes the amendment specified legislators could only be appointed as mayor of capitals. This is probably the reason why some state constitutions say state legislators could keep the seat if appointed mayor.

The 1946 Constitution stipulated that:

Art 51 - O Deputado ou Senador investido na função de Ministro de Estado, interventor federal ou Secretário de Estado não perde o mandato.

Similar provisions exist in all state constitutions. One state constitution guarantees the standard double-dipping privileges to city councilors (Sergipe) and another one extends those

privileges to municipal-level cabinet positions (Paraíba), but in general, this is left to the municipalities to decide, as reported below.

In at least some of these cases, double dipping was expanded through constitutional amendments to allow specific individuals to hold on to their legislative jobs while being appointed to executive positions, such as when Piauí state legislator Pablo Santos was appointed to head of a state foundation or when Alagoas state legislator Elionaldo Magalhães was appointed head of a Federal development agency.

F1 Acre

Art. 43. Não perderá o mandato o deputado:

I - investido no cargo de secretário de Estado, de prefeito de capital ou chefe de missão diplomática ou cultural temporária;

F2 São Paulo

Artigo 17 - Não perderá o mandato o Deputado:

I - investido na função de Ministro de Estado, Governador de Território, Secretário de Estado, do Distrito Federal, de Território, de Prefeitura de Capital ou chefe de missão diplomática temporária;

F3 Alagoas

Art. 77. Não perderá o mandato de state legislator: I – Investido no cargo de Ministro de Estado, Secretário Nacional, Superintendente de Órgão Federal de Desenvolvimento Regional, Governador de Território, de Secretário de Estado, do Distrito Federal, de Territórios, de Prefeituras da Capital ou de Chefe de missão diplomática temporária; (Redação dada pela Emenda Constitucional nº 5/1991.)

REDAÇÃO DADA PELA EMENDA CONSTITUCIONAL No 4/1991:

“I – Investido no cargo de Ministro de Estado, Secretário Nacional, Superintendente de Órgão Federal de Desenvolvimento Regional, Presidente de Autarquia, Empresa Pública, Sociedade de Economia Mista da União e do Estado de Alagoas, Governador de Território, de Secretário de Estado, do Distrito Federal, de Território, de Prefeituras da Capital ou de Chefe de missão diplomática temporária.”

REDAÇÃO ORIGINAL:

“I – Investido no cargo de Ministro de Estado, de Governador de Território, de Secretário de Prefeitura Municipal, de Estado, do Distrito Federal e de Território, bem como de chefe de missão diplomática temporária.”

Collor appointed Elionaldo Magalhães (<http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-biografico/elionaldo-mauricio-magalhaes-morais>), who was a state deputy in Alagoas, to head SUDENE in 1991 (same year of the amendment). So this amendment seems to have been directed to allow this one specific deputy to have an appointment and not lose his elective office.

F4 Amapá

Art. 99. Não perderá o mandato o Deputado: I - investido no cargo de Ministro de Estado, Governador de Território, Secretário de Estado, Secretário de Prefeitura Municipal ou chefe de missão diplomática temporária;

F5 Amazonas

Art. 25. Não perderá o mandato o Deputado: I - investido no cargo de Ministro de Estado, Secretário de Estado, Secretário do Distrito Federal, Secretário Geral da Presidência da República, Secretários de Ministérios, Secretário Municipal da Capital, Reitor de Universidade, Superintendente de Órgão de Desenvolvimento Regional, Diretor Presidente de Autarquia ou Chefe de Missão Diplomática Temporária; (Redação da EC 11/1992)

Before amendment 11/1992: “I - investido no cargo de Ministro de Estado, Secretário de Estado, Secretário do Distrito Federal, Secretário Municipal da Capital ou Chefe de Missão Diplomática temporária”.

Manuel Silva Rodrigues was appointed superintendent of the SUFRAMA (related to the Zona Franca) in 1992, but I still couldn't find evidence the change was thought for him or for the SUFRAMA in particular.

F6 Bahia

Art. 87. Não perderá o mandato o Deputado: I - investido no cargo de Ministro de Estado, Governador de Território, Secretário de Estado, do Distrito Federal, de Território, de prefeitura da Capital ou no de chefe de missão diplomática temporária;

F7 Ceará

Art. 54. Não perderá o mandato o Deputado: *I – investido no cargo de Ministro de Estado, Governador de Território, Secretário de Estado, do Distrito Federal, de Território, da Prefeitura da Capital ou Chefe de Missão Diplomática Temporário, ou a eles equiparados.

F8 Distrito Federal

Art. 64. Não perderá o mandato o Deputado Distrital:

I - investido na função de Ministro de Estado, Secretário-Executivo de Ministério ou equivalente, Secretário de Estado, Administrador Regional, Chefe de Missão Diplomática Temporária ou dirigente máximo de Autarquia, Fundação Pública, Agência, Empresa Pública ou Sociedade de Economia Mista pertencentes à Administração Pública Federal e Distrital;

NOTA: FICA SUBSTITUÍDA A EXPRESSÃO “SECRETÁRIO DE GOVERNO DO DISTRITO FEDERAL” POR “SECRETÁRIO DE ESTADO DO DISTRITO FEDERAL”, CONFORME EMENDA À LEI ORGÂNICA Nº 44 DE 29/11/05 – DODF DE 09/12/05.

Before amendments:

I - investido na função de Ministro de Estado, Secretário de Governo do Distrito Federal ou chefe de missão diplomática temporária; NOVA REDAÇÃO - EMENDA A LEI ORGÂNICA Nº 20, DE 24/11/97, PUBLICADA NO DODF DE 28.11.97

“I - investido na função de Ministro de Estado, Secretário de Governo, Administrador Regional ou chefe de missão diplomática temporária;“ NOVA REDAÇÃO DADA AO INCISO I DO ART. 64 – EMENDA A LEI ORGÂNICA Nº 37, DE 03/01/02, PUBLICADA NO DODF DE 28/02/02.

“I - investido na função de Ministro de Estado, Secretário de Estado, Administrador Regional ou chefe de Missão Diplomática Temporária;“ NOVA REDAÇÃO DADA AO INCISO I DO ART. 64 – EMENDA A LEI ORGÂNICA Nº 39, DE 30/12/02, PUBLICADA NO DODF DE 10/03/03.

DF allows for a lot of positions. Possibly related to the amount of federal bureaucracy in Brasilia

F9 Espírito Santo

Art. 54. Não perderá o mandato o Deputado: I - investido no cargo de Ministro de Estado, Governador de Território, Secretário de Estado, do Distrito Federal, de Território e de Prefeitura Municipal ou de chefe de missão diplomática temporária; Inciso I com redação dada pela EC n.º 20/99.

Amendment changed “Prefeitura de Capital” to “Prefeitura Municipal”. Important to note that Vitória is one of the smallest state capitals; it has a population of 350k and there are 3 other cities larger than it in the state.

F10 Goiás

Art. 15 - Não perderá o mandato o Deputado Estadual que estiver:

I - investido no cargo de Ministro de Estado, de Governador de Território ou de Secretário de Estado, do Distrito Federal, de Território, de Prefeitura da Capital ou de chefe de missão diplomática temporária;

A 2010 amendment actually removed a possibility – before then, it included “Prefeitura da Capital ou de Município com população superior a duzentos mil habitantes”.

F11 Maranhão

Art. 39 – Não perderá o mandato o Deputado: I – investidos no cargo de Ministros de Estado, Governador de Território, de Secretário de Estado, do Distrito Federal, de Território, de Prefeitura de Capital, de interventor Municipal ou Chefe de Missão Diplomática. (modificado pela Emenda à Constituição nº 016, de 14/12/1995).

(Still couldn't find out what the 1995 amendment was about)

F12 Mato Grosso

Art. 32 Não perderá o mandato o Deputado Estadual: I - investido no cargo de Ministro de Estado, Secretário de Estado e de Prefeitura da Capital;

F13 Mato Grosso do Sul

Art. 61. Não perderá o mandato o Deputado:

I - investido no cargo de Ministro ou Secretário de Estado ou chefe de missão diplomática temporária;

F14 Minas Gerais

Art. 59 – Não perderá o mandato o Deputado: I – investido em cargo de Ministro de Estado, Governador de Território, Secretário de Estado, do Distrito Federal, de Território, de Prefeitura de Capital ou de chefe de missão diplomática temporária;

F15 Pará

Art. 98. Não perderá o mandato o Deputado:

I - investido no cargo de Ministro de Estado, Governador de Território, Secretário de Estado, do Distrito Federal, de Território, de Prefeitura de Capital ou chefe de missão diplomática temporária;

F16 Paraíba

Art. 58. Não perderá o mandato o Deputado: I - investido no cargo de Ministro de Estado, Secretário de Estado ou Secretário de Prefeitura com população superior a duzentos mil habitantes;

Interestingly, the state constitution also has a provision for vereadores:

§ 1º Não perderá o mandato o Vereador: I - investido nas funções de Ministro, de Secretário de Estado ou de Município;

F17 Pernambuco

Art. 11. Não perderá o mandato o Deputado:

I - investido na função de Ministro de Estado, Governador de Território, Secretário de Estado, do Distrito Federal, de Território e da Prefeitura da Capital, ou desempenhando, com previa licença da Assembléia Legislativa, missão temporária de caráter diplomático;

F18 Paraná

Art. 60. Não perderá o mandato o Deputado:

I - investido no cargo de Ministro de Estado, Governador de Território, Secretário de Estado, Secretário de Prefeitura de Capital ou chefe de missão diplomática temporária;

F19 Piauí

Art. 68. Não perderá o mandato o Deputado: I - investido no cargo de Ministro de Estado, Governador de Território, Secretário de Estado, Secretário da Capital, chefe de missão diplomática ou cultural temporária, interventor municipal, ou dirigente máximo de Fundação estatal com personalidade jurídica de direito privado pertencente a Administração Pública Estadual

Inciso I com redação dada pela Emenda Constitucional nº 48, de 23.03.2017, DOE de 24.03.2017, em vigor na data da sua primeira publicação. O inciso alterado dispunha o seguinte: "I - investido no cargo de Ministro de Estado, Governador de Território, Secretário de Estado,

Secretário da Capital, chefe de missão diplomática ou cultural temporária, ou interventor municipal;”

Similar to the case in Alagoas: state legislator Pablo Santos was appointed to head the Fundação Estatal Piauiense de Serviços Hospitalares – FEPISERH, a state foundation, shortly after the amendment passed.

F20 Rio de Janeiro

Art. 105 - Não perderá o mandato o Deputado: * I - investido no cargo de Ministro de Estado, Governador de Território, Secretário de Estado, do Distrito Federal, de Território, Secretário Municipal de Prefeitura de Capital e de Município com no mínimo 300.000 eleitores, ou de Chefe de missão diplomática temporária; * Nova redação dada pela Emenda Constitucional nº 14, de 06 de dezembro de 2000.

Before amendment:

I - investido no cargo de Ministro de Estado, Governador de Território, Secretário de Estado, do Distrito Federal, de Território, de Prefeitura de Capital, ou de Chefe de missão diplomática temporária;

F21 Rio Grande do Norte

Art. 41. Não perde o mandato o Deputado: I – investido no cargo de Ministro de Estado, Secretário deste Estado, da Prefeitura da Capital ou chefe de missão diplomática temporária;

F22 Rio Grande do Sul

Art. 55. Aplicam-se aos Deputados as regras da Constituição Federal sobre inviolabilidade, imunidades, remuneração, perda de mandato, licença, impedimento e incorporação às Forças Armadas.

Interesting article that just says state legislators are subject to the same restrictions as federal deputies and senators.

F23 Rondônia

Art. 35. Não perderá o mandato o Deputado: I - investido no cargo de Ministro de Estado, Governador de Território, Secretário de Estado, do Distrito Federal, de Território ou de Prefeitura, Prefeito de Capital, Administrador de Município recém-criado, Interventor de Município, Chefe de Missão Diplomática Temporária, Diretor Geral de Autarquia Estadual ou Federal, Presidente de Empresa Pública Estadual ou Federal; (NR dada pela EC nº 093, de 28/01/2015 – DO-e-ALE. nº 018, de 30/01/2015)

Redação anterior: I - investido no cargo de Ministro de Estado, Governador de Território, Secretário de Estado, do Distrito Federal, de Território ou de Prefeitura, Prefeito de Capital, Administrador de Município recém-criado, Interventor de Município ou chefe de missão diplomática temporária;

The amendment removed the provision for Prefeito de Capital and added Diretor de Autarquia and Presidente de Empresa Pública Estadual ou Federal.

F24 Roraima

Subject to three amendments adding positions over the course of two years. Went from:

Art. 37. Não perderá o mandato o Deputado: I - investido na função de Ministro de Estado, Governador de Território, Secretário de Estado do Distrito Federal, de Território, de Prefeitura de Capital ou de chefe de missão diplomática temporária;

to:

I - investido na função de Ministro de Estado, Governador de Território, Secretário de Estado do Distrito Federal, de Território, de Município no Estado, de Presidente de Fundação, Presidente de Órgão da Administração Indireta do Poder Executivo Estadual ou de Chefe de Missão Diplomática temporária; e Assessoria Especial do Poder Executivo; (Inciso com redação dada pela Emenda Constitucional n° 13/2002).

F25 Santa Catarina

Art. 45. Não perderá o mandato o Deputado:

I - investido no cargo de Ministro de Estado, Governador de Território, Secretário de Estado, do Distrito Federal, de Território, da Prefeitura da Capital ou de chefe de missão diplomática temporária;

F26 Sergipe

Art. 45. Não perderá o mandato o Deputado:

I - investido no cargo de Ministro de Estado, Governador de Território, Secretário de Estado, Secretário Municipal da Capital ou Chefe de Missão Diplomática temporária;

Like Paraíba, Sergipe also has a provision for Vereadores in the state constitution:

Art. 15. Não perderá o mandato o Vereador: I - investido no cargo de Ministro de Estado, Secretário de Estado, Secretário Municipal;

F27 Tocantins

Art. 24. Não perderá o mandato o Deputado: I - investido no cargo de Ministro de Estado, Governador de Território, Secretário de Estado, do Distrito Federal, de Território, de Prefeitura de Capital ou chefe de missão diplomática temporária;

Appendix G Ethical considerations

All the observational data used in this paper are available from public sources, as described in Section Appendix E, and include information on individuals who chose a career in public service and/or politics.

The only primary data used in this paper was used to estimate the importance of each electoral position. Data for this analysis came from a survey of Brazilian congresspeople fielded by the authors in 2021. This research was deemed exempt from evaluation by OXFORD IRB IN DATE PROTOCOL NUMBER and was approved by FGV's board for research ethics with human subjects in DATE PROTOCOL.